Ron Milam

Spring 2000

Empire, War and Revolution

Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, New York: Vintage Books, 1994. PiX-585+ references & index.

How does one review a book whose sub-title is A History of the world, 1914-1991? (Or as Mel Brooks might say – A History of the World, Part II). Professor Hobsbawm’s previous works include the three “Ages” – Revolution, Capital, and Empire, but this is his first comprehensive work which attempts to chronicle history as an observer, rather than as a scholar. At the outset, he admits to having avoided this period previously, because “his period” is the nineteenth century, and he acknowledges that much of this book is based on anecdotal evidence, interviews, and media rather than on scholarly research. Nevertheless, he accepted the challenge of writing on the current century, if not necessarily studying it.

And write about it he has; a monograph of 600 pages. He sees the Short Twentieth century, from 1914 to 1991, as a “triptych” or historical sandwich. He describes the period from 1914 to post World War II as the Age of Catastrophe, and documents the various events leading up to both wars, as well as discussing the roles of the various participating belligerents. The period following World War II is described as the Golden Age, which in his opinion, probably changed society more than “any other period of comparable brevity.” This period, which included the bulk of the Cold War, ended in early 1970’s, and helped define the tenets on which capitalism and socialism would play out in later years. Lastly, the period from early 1970’s to 1991 is seen as the Landslide, but it could have been referred to as a second Age of Catastrophe, in which large parts of the world saw their boundaries change, and their systems collapse, as in Africa, parts of Asia, and obviously, the end of the Soviet Union. The book deals chronologically with each of the periods, but reverts often to topical treatments of select issues.

Hobsbawm’s perspective on the world, as viewed by a German born, English bred, sometime American resident is that liberalism was in hasty retreat leading up to the Age of Catastrophe. He describes liberalism as a “distrust of dictatorship” and absolute rule, a commitment to constitutional government with freely elected officials, and accepted citizen’s rights and liberties, including speech, publication, and assembly. Documenting the evidence, he cites 35 elected governments in 1920, 17 in 1938, and 12 in 1944. The world seemed to be heading to the “right”, and the 2 wars, including the interwar period of economic uncertainty among the major powers, crystallized the various roles that states would play in the aftermath of hostilities. Against a common enemy, and Hobsbawm states clearly that World War II was about Hitler, the “good guys” won, and they set out to redefine the world in economic terms which satisfied their own goals. It is at this point that capitalism and socialism squared off, even though both systems had been tested and reformed prior to the war.

Hobsbawm is a socialist, and proceeds to describe the rest of the century as a disappointment because socialism could not compete with capitalism in most nation-states. He identifies the collapse of the Soviet Union as a defeat of the top tier, because of inter-party squabbles and the desire of reformer Mikhail Gorbachev to install democratic ideals rather than as a desire on the part of the citizenry to give up on socialism. Whether this conclusion is based upon polling data, or upon observation that no one living in the Soviet Union in 1989 ever lived under anything but socialism, and therefore accepted the Soviet regime as legitimate, complete with its accompanying police state, is unclear. Hobsbawm’s conclusion seems to be that the Soviet Union collapsed because Gorbachev wanted it to, and that the bigger question, and yet unresolved, is how such a communist reformer ever survived to become Stalin’s successor. This conclusion assumes that the citizenry of the Soviet Union accepted their form of government in a vacuum, without recognizing that modern communications were available, which allowed them to see what was going on in Hungary, Poland, China (Tiananmen Square). It is reasonable to assume that the citizenry accepted the proposals for glasnost, without giving much thought to aspects of perestroika, which would ultimately reform their lives, and lead initially to chaos and some economic deprivation. Perhaps Gorbachev deserves “credit” for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War, however, the collapse began with the surrounding communist states, and the political inertia was building up in Europe to the extent that it only needed half-hearted acceptance by the Russian citizenry to push it over the cliff. Human nature and the desire for perceived freedom, which glasnost offered, was at least as responsible for the collapse as was Mr. Gorbachev.

An interesting corollary to Hobsbawm’s view of Gorbachev as the man who ended the cold war, and he captions his picture thusly, is the treatment given Ronald Reagan. He believes the Cold War ended in Reykjarik because Reagan “broke through the dense screen of ideologists, fanatics, careerists, and professional warriors around him with his simple minded idealism to let himself be convinced that coexistence between the USA and USSR should not be based upon an abhorrent balance of mutual nuclear terror.” Perhaps the simple-mindedness is an accurate description, but the duality of credit to these two leaders may be somewhat overstated, and should probably not be enough to get Mr. Reagan chiseled on Mt. Rushmore. World events, and the desire of the Soviet citizenry to experience “freedom” deserves some credit.

Comparing the view of Hobsbawm’s world to Williams in Tragedy, it is somewhat refreshing to see that the U.S.A. did not influence all events, and that, with the exception of the cold war, America’s role was important but not all empowering. In fact, Williams believes that Roosevelt was looking for a reason to enter WWII, while Hobsbawm concludes that without Pearl Harbor, the U.S. would have continued to stay out of the war. Regarding the U.S.’s role in the cold war, Williams and Hobsbawm converge in beliefs somewhat in that they both believe that the U.S., with its virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons, failed to offer the Soviet Union a major role in the world, and forced them to fight for their role in a cold war. Hobsbawm, particularly, is very critical of J.F.K. for being such a cold warrior, and for fueling the flames with his inaugural address. He believes J.F.K., through apocalyptic rhetoric, created a world where the democracy of the United States endangered the world more that the Soviet Union. Williams, I believe, would agree with his assessment.

Hobsbawm’s book contributes to our anecdotal understanding of our recent history, and is useful as a tool for inspiring readers to pursue further research. It was not intended otherwise, and the author acknowledges it as such. The book should be seen as the observations of an eyewitness to history, written through the eyes of an expert in the 19^th century, whose keen eyes bring a refreshing perspective to the 20^th century.