Ron Milam
Empire, War and Revolution
April 25, 2000
Dr. Bob Buzzanco
Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, revised edition: American – Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994. 1183 pg. Plus index.
Raymond Garthoff, former ambassador to Bulgaria and career State Department employee, has written an exhaustive volume on détente, with additional information on the failure of détente, or confrontation. This is an insider’s view of Nixon and Kissinger policy, followed by the Carter administration’s change in policy to one of confrontation. Within this chronological study, Garthoff deals with virtually every foreign policy issue that impacted U.S.-Soviet relations, and views them from not only the American side, but his perception of the Soviet view on the same issue. This edition has been revised from the 1985 edition by use of corrabative evidence from Soviet sources.
The main thesis of this book is that Nixon and Kissinger put the policy of détente into place because it was imperative to neutralize Soviet influence in the world, and that open communication and relaxing of rhetoric would enable the U.S. to operate more effectively in world affairs. The Soviet Union accepted détente for the same reasons, and felt their best interests could be served with the same open approach.
Garthoff is reasonably complimentary of Nixon’s approach to foreign policy. Without addressing the substance of each decision, he believes Nixon’s approach to foreign affairs, when he came into office, was refreshing compared to the liberal, hawkish cold warrior attitudes of his predecessors. That he found an academician who could articulate his views on a higher intellectual plane was, according to Garthoff, a “choice of genius on his part,”1 in that Kissinger subscribed to most of Nixon’s views of the world. Kissinger had been Nelson Rockefeller’s professor at Harvard, and he had an ability to transform Nixon’s views into policy, and to execute that which Nixon believed was essential. Garthoff believes that Nixon and Kissinger were the first leaders who accepted Soviet interests for what they were, without developing policy which attempted to change their view of the world. This pragmatic concept had its limitations, and the personal motivation and damaging secrecy of their approach would ultimately have dire consequences on the nation and the world, but since this book discusses détente as a policy that was effective for a short time, one draws conclusions from this volume that Garthoff believes these two key figures had incredible positive impact on the world, at least for a few years.
Since this is an all-encompassing work, this review will focus on a select few issues of interest, particularly the successful attempt of triangular diplomacy with China, and the ensuing end to the war in Vietnam. According to Garthoff, China became suspicious of Soviet policy when the Brezhnev Doctrine was invoked in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This action was supported by North Vietnam, and China protested because of fear that they would invade other socialist states undergoing counterrevolutionary threats, such as Romania. China sent feelers out to the U.S., and this signal ultimately led to Sino-American ambassadorial talks. Nixon was very much in favor of China initiatives, but Kissinger was not. Many factors led to his reluctance to feel China talks were important, but Garthoff believes that his lack of research on China left him vulnerable to State Department experts as resources, thus he couldn’t use his own expertise to make policy recommendations. Thus, according to Garthoff, it was Nixon who sold Kissinger on the Chinese initiative, and Kissinger reluctantly “climbed the learning curve” and ultimately became the leading, though secretive force behind the China initiative. Garthoff reinforces this point by citing Nixon’s acceptance of assumption of Sino-American talks in November 1968, prior to Kissinger being named to his post in the administration.
The China policy also set the tone for diplomacy initiatives in the Nixon administration, because they would usually be conducted in secrecy, not only from the rest of the world, but also from the State Department. The China initiative worked to allow the U.S. to initiate actions with both China and the Soviet Union, which created concerns and fears to the other party. When the Soviet Union requested U.S. support in fall, 1969 to a conventional strike against Chinese ICBM sites, in order to protest a border dispute, the U.S. strongly opposed. And when Kissinger flew to Peking in the fall, 1970 to discuss the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan, the State Department was left out of the loop, completely. Substantiated reports from State Department officials who prepared Kissinger for his trip indicate he showed Zhou Enlai high-resolution photographs of Soviet military emplacements along the Sino-Soviet border.2 This was done without knowledge or approval of the CIA, but with approval of the President.
In a chapter titled “The Crucible for Triangular Diplomacy: Ending the War in Vietnam, 1969-1972, Garthoff weaves his way through the various diplomatic initiatives associated with ending the war on U.S. terms. He describes Nixon’s approach to the war as being consistent with his pragmatic approach toward other issues, and completely opposite of that of Kennedy and Johnson regarding the lack of Sino-Soviet hegemony over North Vietnam. After having shared communiqués with both countries regarding planned troop withdrawals and escalations in bombing, Nixon adopted a policy of moving forward if he saw little or no resistance from the super-powers. Furthermore, since he was able to offer incentives to the Soviets regarding SALT, and to China regarding trade, the U.S. was, to a limited degree, the beneficiary of benevolent actions by the Chinese and Soviet leadership that limited North Vietnam’s own military initiatives. For example, Garthoff believes that China was instrumental in delaying their March initiative until after Nixon’s summit meeting with Mao Zedong, lest the U.S. be put into a position of having to cancel the summit, or in China’s case canceling because of the U.S.’s response. Russia even resented the fact that Hanoi chose to not delay the offensive and it did in fact cause friction within the Communist party regarding the May 1972 summit between Nixon and Brezhnez. The summit was held, but Nixon was able to diffuse the Soviet concern by virtue of the summit having been held at all. And it has been reported that Kissinger communicated continuously during the Paris peace talks with both the Soviets and Chinese. When the U.S. destroyed Soviet vessels in Haiphong harbor, resulting in several deaths of Soviet sailors, the Soviets protested only mildly. Garthoff concludes that Nixon and Kissinger used China and the Soviet Union to neutralize North Vietnam by their ambivalence, and it enabled the U.S. to continue military operations that ultimately led to peace provisions favorable to the U.S.
Garthoff details the decline of détente and the rise of confrontation when the Carter administration came into power. He places much of the blame for the failure on Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Polish national security advisor who replaced Henry Kissinger. Brzezinski was a consummate cold warrior that had advised Carter during the 1976 campaign, and had criticized détente as executed by the Nixon and Ford administrations. This change in not only administrations, but also in strategy was very unsettling to China and the Soviet Union, and they failed to comprehend the sudden change in direction. The Carter administration was less centralized in its handling of foreign policy than the Nixon administration, but Carter was naïve and not as experienced as Nixon, thus he had to rely more on his staff and advisors.
Garthoff is somewhat complimentary of the Nixon-Kissinger approach to foreign policy, in that it was formalized and structured, and was goal oriented. He states that Nixon’s was the only administration that published annual foreign policy updates. But he criticized Nixon’s secretive centralized negotiating that led to subverting the authority of the State Department. It also sent misleading signals to China and Russia as to who spoke for the administration. But he believes it was effective in its own way.
The approach Garthoff uses in his book is to research the biographies and memoirs of the various participants, and then to verify the selective memory lapses with his own experience and personal interviews. Whether this technique results in historical accuracy is questionable, but the insider’s view is somewhat engrossing.