Scott Parkin

Hist6393: Empire, War and Revolution

March 6, 2000

Dr. Buzzanco

Michael J. Hogan. A Cross of Iron:Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 525 pp. plus Biblio, Notes and Index.

Michael J. Hogan's A Cross of Iron traces the development of America's national security apparatus in the first decade of the Cold War. Focusing solely on the United States' role during the Cold War, Hogan describes various political and budgetary skirmishes within the federal government in a continual debate over the growth of the national security state. Hogan's thesis argues that the debate pitted supporters of the national security establishment (e.g. Dean Acheson, James Forrestal) against conservative and isolationist supporters of the traditional political order (e.g. Robert Taft) who feared a "garrison state" that undermined American values and institutions and against liberal supporters of a New Deal welfare state (e.g. Henry Wallace) feared a rollback of gains made during the 1930's. The issues encompassing this debate include the National Security Act, the organization of the Defense Department, universal military training or UMT, oversight of scientific research and development, placement of US troops in Europe and other various budget priorities. Hogan views Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, essentially, as holding the center in this great debate between Cold War "Hawks" or interventionists and conservative isolationist traditionalists.

Following World War Two, political and military leaders developed a new ideology about America's place in the post war world. They envisioned America leading with an interventionist foreign policy backed by an aggressive domestic program of state making to support that policy. A new foreign policy meant the transformation and growth of the US government into a large warfare state prepared for a permanent struggle with the communists. The transformation created a new class of national security and military managers. They included professional foreign affairs or military experts and prominent citizens often coming from the nation's private, scientific or academic sectors. The transformation also affected the Congress as various members familiarizing themselves with foreign policy, quickly learned how to wield defense dollars to curry favor with their districts. The national media also increased coverage of national security and international events.

The isolationist faction led by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio countered this changing environment by arguing that the "garrison state" undermined traditional American values and institutions. Consisting of conservative Republicans, Southern Democrats and their allies in the press this group feared a strong federal government that centralized authority sapped American morale and manpower and undermined American democracy. Hogan describes their position as

"More likely to be assumed than fully defined, these values and traditions included a strong antipathy toward entangling alliances, a large peacetime military establishment, and the centralization of authority in the national government, especially in its military arm. These were European rather than American practices, or so the critics claimed, and they had the potential to waste the nation's resources, create a powerful military caste, and erode the rights of the Congress and the prerogatives of the President." (8).

Conservatives also feared the financial burden that an enlarged state might require from the public. Already opposing the welfare state of the New Deal, the conservative coalition felt a transition towards a warfare state further jeopardized the country's commitment to balanced budgets and fiscal responsibility. These budget deficits encouraged inflation, corrupted the currency and led to higher taxes. Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, opposed the national Security State because it undermined their domestic programs and priorities. This mutual opposition often put political adversaries on the same side.

Truman, his administration and his allies in Congress represented the middle in this debate. Leading the New Deal Democratic coalition, Truman politically obligated himself to liberal Democrats and their supporters, culturally he identified with the conservative rhetoric of fiscal responsibility and traditional American values and realistically Truman saw the need for the enhancement of national security. Being drawn to all sides in this debate, Truman compromised over the growth of the national security state. While not allowing the military and the Cold War "Hawks" to build a statist militarist "Fortress America", Truman also realized that isolationist America of the 1920's and 1930's had ended with Pearl Harbor.

Often at odds with the national security managers and the conservatives, Truman and "conservative economizers" in his administration attempted to balance economic concerns with security concerns leading to internecine political conflict. This often ruthless and mean-spirited debate saw Secretary of Defense James Forrestal suffer a mental breakdown and commit suicide, Navy admirals treasonously "revolt" against the awardance of the B-36 project to the Air Force, the Truman administration enact a McCarthy style loyalty program and the bitter presidential campaign in 1952. The notion of semiwar also emerged during these debates. The ideology of semiwar stated that during the Cold War America had to be constantly prepared for conventional conflict with the Soviets and their allies. When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, America turned this ideal into policy. Subsequently, America put itself on permanent active duty during the Cold War and the unpleasant nature of this mission trickled into the political debate of the time.

Hogan briefly discussed Eisenhower's role during the early Cold War period. Although they conflicted bitterly during the election of 1952, Eisenhower's military and national security policy varied little from Truman's. Eisenhower's "New Look' policy balanced economic priorities against national security policy much like Truman's. Hogan does take his title from a 1953 Eisenhower speech

"As a result of the Cold War, Eisenhower concluded, humanity was "hanging from a cross of iron," with "every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired" signifying "a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed."" (417).

Michael Hogan's book is a phenomenal work about the early Cold War. He researched a variety of public and private primary records to write this study on the transformation of the American state. It is an excellent book for historians and political scientists interested in political history and the way our government works. It is also important because he explains the origins of the National Security establishment. I found this book very informative and an important work in my limited knowledge of the area.

This book really contributes to the continuity of my readings in the class. As we have discussed the evolution of the American empire, this book really represents the pinnacle of that empire. The books on the earlier periods really laid out policy and structure for the emergence of America during this time. At the beginning of the modern period, Hogan's book is an excellent step into the establishment of America's foreign policy establishment.