The thesis of The CIA in Guatemala is straightforward: the revolt against the Arbenz government in 1954 was not just another example of Big Stick diplomacy but was a significant link in the unfolding of Cold War history. The context of the Cold
War explains the actions of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The method of revolt and its success also explain the failure of The Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.
 

The Build Up
 Immerman covers the history of Guatemala from its beginning in 1821 and explains the development of circumstances that would lead to the US-backed insurrection in 1954. Guatemala was the dominant country in Central America when the region broke with Spain. It lead an effort to create a confederation of Central American states but failed because neighboring states feared Guatemala’s strength.

 The country developed a feudal, caste social structure composed of Criollos (Europeans), Ladinos (Mestizos), and Mayans. The sequence indicates social dominance. Criollos controlled vast estates, the professions, and politics. Ladinos were almost indistinguishable in appearance from the Mayans and constituted a marginal buffer class between the extremes. Mayans estranged themselves from society, politics, and commerce by staying in the remote western sections of the country.
 Beginning in the late 19th Century the North American giant, the United Fruit Company, dominated the economic development of the country. In fact, it controlled the banana industry in virtually all of Central America. United Fruit tightened its grip in the 1930’s and 1940’s with extortionate tax, land, and operational agreements with the ruling Guatemalan caudillo, Jorge Ubico Castenada. Ubico enacted very harsh labor laws that exploited the Mayans. These measures not only made Guatemala a lucrative location for United Fruit, but they fixed a close association between United Fruit and Ubico.

 United Fruit was almost antipolar to the Laguna Company which operated lumber and chicole plantations across the border in Mexico. Laguna provided infrastructural support (including hospitals, housing, and insurance) for its indigenous employees. More important, it opened managerial positions to its native workers at wage scales that were reasonable and in line with those of North American workers.

 In 1944 popular unrest erupted and ousted Ubico. He managed to install as his successor General Frederico Ponce Vaides, who was another caudillo from the criollo caste. Disaffection was strong enough that Jacobo Guzman Arbenz and Francisco Javier Arana lead a successful military coup against Ponce. In a few months the country held its first free election, and chose Juan Jose Arevalo Bermej as president.

 The coup and the election was actually a middle class revolt rather than a Communist one. There were Communists in Guatemala but they were hardly significant. Arevalo headed a group of idealistic students, army officers, and middle class supporters that sought change, liberalism, and democracy. They wanted to free Guatemala from autocracy and dependence on developed nations (actually, exploitation by United Fruit).

 In Arevalo’s view Guatemala needed social changes which only the government could perform. The feudal system was too entrenched. These changes were not Communistic; he did not propose expropriation and nationalization of United Fruit property. Immerman points out that Arevalo’s reforms did not go as far as FDR’s or Atlee’s. These egalitarian ideals however moderate lead to conflict with United Fruit. Furthermore, Arevalo’s program angered and frightened caudillos in other Central American countries. They did not want any sort of liberalism to break out in the region.

 The Cold War blinded the Truman Administration to any view of a third way. Arevalo was not with us, so he must be against us. He had to be a Communist. Several influences steered this thinking. The Yenan Way by Eudocio Racines suggested the Communist Chinese model may apply to Latin America. Racines had studied China and noted Mao’s pragmatism: allying with bourgeoisie and accepting liberal half-measures temporarily as part of the plan to achieve power. The Truman Administration worried this was true of Guatemala. Ambassadorial choices were not always the best for reading the situation correctly. Richard Patterson was an ardent anti-Communist and was prone to seeing Communism even if it was not there. Edward Bernays fanned the flames of public relations on behalf of United Fruit. Of course, Guatemala was on the US’s doorstep. The Truman Administration was highly suspicious.
 
 

 Circumstances turned for the worse in 1952. Arbenz succeeded Arevalo and instituted major land reforms. The reforms were not aimed solely at United Fruit, nor did Arbenz expropriate their land. The Guatemalan government wanted to purchase unused land at reasonable prices and offer it to Mayans. Immerman insists that United Fruit was an impetus for US intervention, but it was not the reason it occurred. Government documents indicate the motive was an intention to stamp out Communism.
 The other major change in 1952 was Eisenhower’s election. He believed in covert action and wanted to use it.

The Revolt
 Eisenhower sent John Doherty of the CIA in the summer of 1953 and the subversion in Guatemala turned serious. The Eisenhower Administration tried to build support for intervention within the OAS. It moved anti-Communism to the top of the agenda at the Caracas Conference. It stifled unwanted interference in the UN. The Administration embargoed arms to Guatemala, driving Arbenz to the Soviets. US agents exposed this and used it to heighten tensions.

 The revolt itself was a weak affair based on covert operations and maximum use of psychology. The CIA chose a leader, Carlos Enrique Castillo Armas, armed his small, ill-trained followers, staged them in Honduras, and prepared covert air cover in Panama.  Castillo moved 6 miles inside the Guatemalan border and stopped. The CIA set up a radio transmitter in the jungle and broadcast reports to Guatemala City that exaggerated the strength and success of the rebels. A few bombing runs produced loud, but sparse and ineffectual explosions. Arbenz helped add to the confusion by shutting of the city’s electricity. The Guatemalan Army succumbed, and Arbenz was out because few people wanted to risk supporting him.

 The insurrection succeeded with little military effort, deep covert support (the CIA removed all evidence quickly), and relied on maximum psychological effect. The CIA believed it had a winning combination.

The Aftermath
 Ironically, Arevalo and Arbenz failed because they employed relatively moderate reforms to overcome the inequalities in Guatemalan society. The feudal elements reasserted themselves. The Mayans and the Ladinos had not taken enough power to sustain the reforms. A small amount of opposition could topple the liberal regime.

 A further irony is that the US wished by 1979 it had someone like Arbenz governing Guatemala. It wished the middle class reforms had succeeded and stabilized the country.

 Guatemala had a disastrous effect on Bay of Pigs. The CIA (particularly Richard Bissell) assumed the experience in Guatemala was transferable to Cuba. It was not. Cuba required more effective military support because it was an invasion by sea. (Stronger military support conflicted with covert action, however.) Castro had eliminated the Cuban Army and replaced it with his own militia. The Cuban populace supported Castro, and he had stronger nerves than Arbenz. Success in Guatemala blinded the Kennedy Administratio and CIA to basic questions about planning and strategy. The result was a humiliation.

Conclusion
 Of course, the social reform problems in Central America still persist and have re-ignited most prominently in Chiapas, Mexico. Alternative news reports suggest the Mexican and US governments may be repeating mistaken policy as well. Mexican Mayans see recent modification of land reform laws (Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution) as an attempt to roll back restrictions and allow large landholdings by North Americans. The implications are much larger because Mexico is a larger and more developed nation than Guatemala of the mid 1950’s.

 Events may not repeat in exactly the same way, but it is easy to see similarities. Trouble in Chiapas suggests political instability to US investors. Investment funds dry up. Mexico City panics. It does not view the revolt as principally a social one and feels compelled to stamp it out. The US military trains counter insurgency units in the Mexican army to carry out clandestine operations hidden from international view. The problem persists.

 The Guatemalan story has another ironic conclusion which is implicit in this book. The US produced in Cuba what it sought to prevent in Guatemala. The Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent embargo drove Castro to the Soviet Union and put a Communist state even closer to the US doorstep.