Scott Parkin
27 March 2000
Dr. Buzzanco
Hist6393: Empire, War and Revolution
Richard H. Immerman. The CIA in Guatemala:The Foreign Policy of Intervention. Austin,TX:The University of Texas Press, 1982. 291 pp. plus Biblio, Notes and Index.
Richard H. Immerman's The CIA in Guatemala:The Foreign Policy of Intervention relates the shocking truth about the development of American commercial and political policy in Guatemala. Incorporating the social and political history of Guatemala, declassified CIA documents via the Freedom of Information Act, numerous interviews, articles and other sources, the author recreates early 20th century Guatemalan history culminating in the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz government. He argues that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations used Cold War rhetoric and clandestine operations to overthrow a legitimate middle-class supported "reform" government for the express benefit of the United Fruit company. The book gives an in-depth background to US corporate development of Guatemala during the 19th and 20th centuries and describes how Corporate America coopted the Washington establishment to their policies.
Focusing on social, economic and political factors, Immerman outlines the 1944 Guatemalan revolution that ended a lengthy period of totalitarian rule and set the tiny impoverished nation on the path towards modernization and eventual diplomatic and clandestine confrontation with the United States. A long period of underdevelopment created an environment of cultural repression, economic exploitation and political oppression that caused the1944 revolt against dictator Jorge Ubico Castaneda. Led by the liberal middle class and intellectuals, this movement had no agenda other than the alleviation of some societal ills and the empowerment of the middle class, or ladinos.
Juan Jose Arevalo emerged as the new head of state for the post-revolutionary government. Arevalo supported an incremental program of reform, modernization and education for the unwashed masses of Guatemala, as well as a legitimate constitution similar to the US Constitution. Many of Arevalo's policies alarmed managers at United Fruit as they saw revenue and power dwindling with potential empowerment of Guatemala's lower caste Mayan Indian population and middle class ladinos.
Arevalo's successor, Jacobo Arbenz, further frightened United Fruit (La Frutera) with a land reform bill that sought to diversify the economy and distribute the land more efficiently. In theory, this program eventually would create a stable economy and an independent unified nation. United Fruit vilified this nationalist program as a socialism that ultimately would mean a decline in their power and profit in Guatemala and the rest of Central America. The unanimous passage of agrarian land reform in the national assembly further heightened tension between Arbenz and La Frutera. While the program led to the beginnings of a more diversified expanding economy in Guatemala, it ultimately led to the 1954 coup led by Colonel Castillo Armas, and organized and supported by US economic and political forces.
Immerman’s research connects noted Eisenhower-era Cold War hawks Allen and John Foster Dulles’s exploits in the private sector to the upper echelons at United Fruit and, convincingly details United Fruit’s influence over the executive branch. Using privileged access to the US president and his advisors, executives at United Fruit easily convinced Eisenhower of the imminent communist threat in Guatemala. A fervent anti-communist, John Foster Dulles launched a shortsighted and exaggerated campaign to rid Guatemala of the communist scourge. Extending McCarthyism to foreign policy, American sentiment towards socialism and communism maligned any social democratic or nationalist attempts for Third World reform and the Eisenhower administration reflected the popular opinion by opposing regimes and movements in Guatemala, Iran, Indochina, and others. The business community, the media and members of the government all participated in the vilification of the Arbenz regime.
In early 1953, Eisenhower authorized a clandestine operation known as Operation PBSUCCESS. PBSUCCESS plotted the removal of Jacobo Arbenz from the presidency of Guatemala. The Central Intelligence Agency, headed by Allan Dulles, spearheaded the operation. By 1954, the Agency had trained a small militia of exiles and mercenaries under Castillo Armas and had a small fleet of aircraft prepared to support the rebels on D-Day. Psychologically, the Agency broadcast anti-Arbenz messages over the airwaves, distributed anti-Arbenz leaflets to Guatemala’s middle class and recruited influential Catholic clergy to denounce Arbenz as a communist at the pulpit (this was mostly done for the benefit of the largely illiterate Mayan population). On D-Day, the psychological warfare prevented a misinformed and frightened population from rallying behind their beleaguered president. Although, the mass of Guatemalans stayed home on D-Day the rebel militia still relied on the CIA and militarist elements of the Guatemalan armed forces to eventually force Arbenz to abdicate.
Immerman makes two very important points in the CIA in Guatemala--the first discusses the events set in motion by the US corporate and political forces and the Guatemalan elite that left Guatemala in such a tragic state. The initial conflict in Guatemala divided the country along class lines (and racial lines) with a wealthy minority controlling a disproportionate amount of land and revenue with foreign investors, and the significantly larger lower and middle class controlling very little of the economy or land. Attempts at reform via the 1944 revolution and the subsequent Arevalo and Arbenz governments exasperated the wealthy elite and foreign corporations to the point of eventual American intervention in the name of containment. After 1954, all Guatemalan governments were fervently anti-communist and repressed movement they viewed as threatening to their regime. Subsequently, hundreds of thousands died from 1954 to 1996 after a peace treaty between leftist indigenous groups and the right wing government was signed.
Immerman’s second point deals with issues left out by Michael Hogan in The Origins of the Cold War-- Corporate America’s partnership with the U.S. Federal government. La Frutera had incredible access to the State Department through former associates John Foster Dulles and Allan Dulles. This relationship allowed La Frutera immediate access to policy-makers and significant influence. Once this access was gained and the threat exaggerated by the administration, Arbenz never had a chance.
Richard Immerman recreates a disturbing story of American intervention in the third world from a vast archive of documents. This book angered me as I read about the casual nature that Eisenhower and Dulles determined and conducted foreign policy over this small impoverished nation. It also fits in the continuum of the class on the American foreign policy apparatus. After Hogan’s book, I realized during the late 40’s and early 50’s that the U.S. had created an infrastructure to conduct large scale foreign policy. The CIA in Guatemala displays that structure in effect—the use of the agencies, the ideology and the money brought together by the U.S. Federal Government, as outlined by Hogan, manipulated and devastated a burgeoning Central American republic. It also is a precursory episode that leads the United States into such debacles as Cuba and Vietnam. It is an important book for students of diplomatic history. It shows the arrogance of our nation, culture and system.