Three remarkably different revolutions occurred in the Americas within a century that are compared and analyzed by Lester Langley in The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750-1850. Langley describes the three major revolutions that occurred in the New World into three simple categories: 1) the American Revolution as a revolution from above, 2) the Haitian Revolution as a revolution from below, and 3) the Spanish-American Revolution as a revolution denied. He asserts that a group of American elites vied for not only home rule in the colonies against the British but to establish and maintain their own rule at home against the propertyless, indentured servants, African slaves and so forth. Langley shifts his focus to the rise of Toussaint Louverture and the African slaves in Haiti as they achieved their goals but failed to maintain them. As for the Spanish-American Revolution, he discusses the roles of Spanish-American revolutionaries like Simon Bolivar who successfully overthrew the weakened Spanish government but failed to adopt policies they stood for: Indian rights, an equitable distribution of land, and more governing power to the mestizos, mulattos and blacks. Langley argues that only one, the Haitian Revolution, of the three fits the description of a revolution that brought immediate, sweeping social reforms.

On the American Revolution, Langley clearly points out that the Americans won the war because of British miscalculations and blunder rather than American military superiority. George Washington practically led an army of poor misfits that include "indentures, substitutes, farm workers, unemployed persons, transients, British deserters, foreigners and (save in the lower South) black slaves- who had lived at the margin of colonial society" (Langley, 49). Langley goes on to state, "The Continentals were not the revolutionary soldiers of American myth, but they fought for a society that offered the hope of social advancement if they survived; they were willing to suffer and perhaps die for a cause that had little meaning for them" (50). In short, the majority of American revolutionaries originated from the lower echelon of colonial society at the time of war but their efforts resulted in little or no gain after the British defeat. One account that describes this "wasted effort" from ordinary and poor Americans is James Martin’s Ordinary Courage whose main character joined the revolution against the British in glory and hopefulness only to find hunger and disease during the war, and poverty and obscurity afterwards.

Langley also asserts that those who inspired the revolution from above had neither the intention nor desire to create a revolutionary state (57-58). Rather, the American Revolution actually strengthened gentry rule of the elites like Washington, Jefferson and Franklin and thus, preserved a hierarchical society not an egalitarian one. Furthermore, expansionism beyond the Appalachian comes into play as speculators pushed out the Indians and profited from selling Western lands as they were never equally divided or given to the poor veterans of the revolution. Langley states that after the ratification of the Constitution, government leaders backed Alexander Hamilton’s policies of stabilizing the national government instead of focusing on economic development.

On the Haitian Revolution, Langley compares several differences with that of the American Revolution. First, white planters in Haiti were a white minority in an island predominantly black and colored. Second, white elites in Virginia had a mass of poor whites shielding them from the black slaves at the bottom (108). The rebellion originated as a conflict between whites and free colored over social equality not as a struggle for African freedom (119). However, led by the likes of Louverture, Haitians achieved in twelve years from 1792-1804, what other two revolutions could not: end of colonialism, abolition of slavery and proclaimed racial equality (102). The success and aftermath of the revolution demonstrated the capability of self-government by black Haitian leaders in the Western world. Yet, their success brought debate on the issue of slavery on what trouble could happen if slaves were not emancipated immediately.

However, the Haitian Revolution also cautioned Creole elites in Spanish America to not give too much power to slaves and indigenous laborers. Langley argues that the Creoles, land-owning elites with Spanish blood but born in the Americas, clung to racial categories to justify their social positions (157). The Creoles not only struggled for political and economic power from the peninsulares, pure blooded Spaniards born in Spain, and the Spanish government, but they distanced themselves from mestizos, mulattos, blacks, and Indians. Thus, Creoles wanted independence without war and liberty with a slave and subservient population (168). In Mexico, home rule became their goal rather than an egalitarian social order (182). The Plan de Iguala ends as a conservative constitution that provided and protected the ruling Creoles to establish their rule in Mexico. Iguala remained a far cry from the peasant revolts of Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla and Jose Maria Morelos. The Mexican Independence became no more than a peaceful agreement of a transition of power between the Spanish monarchy and the Creole elites. Langley points out that the legitimacy behind Latin American governments depended heavily on the ability of the state to maintain itself by forceful means (249). As a result, military rule becomes the prevailing power over civilian rule and institutions. Military control over institutions demonstrates the failure of new Latin American governments to adopt a more egalitarian social order.

In the next chapter, Langley reflects on the Revolutionary legacy as he describes Alexis de Tocqueville’s America and Bolivar’s America and comments on the legacy himself. He asserts that Thomas Jefferson symbolizes the political architect of an inland continental empire which disproportionately benefited the few, to persuade the public that national expansion was for the people, not the developers (222). Langley also argues that the framers of the Constitution resolved the "democratic menace" of small and poor farmers and artisans from benefiting this westward expansion by creating institutions that check the excesses of popular government and prevent the rise of a multitude of unpropertied in the cities (222). Langley discusses the change in the U.S. family structure whereas self-responsibility, self-identity, self-determination became the prevailing qualities (236). This idea of a self-made man who is detached from his family origin perpetuates and reassures the ideas of westward expansion, Manifest Destiny and overseas expansion as reasonable and justifiable causes.

By the 1850s, Langley argues, Americans have grasped the Jeffersonian ideals of an "empire of liberty" that expands across the North American continent. However, expansionism evolves into a racist doctrine to justify the growing American civilization. His argument resurfaces in Richard W. Van Alstyne’s article, "The American Empire Makes its Bow on the World Stage, 1803-1845." Alstyne states that Jefferson had imperial plans and designs for the United States to conquer Mexico and establish colonies there as well.

Overall, Langley provides adequate explanation of the three revolutions and how they differentiate from each other. Why he cuts off at the year 1850 remains a question but one can conclude that is when the designs of Manifest Destiny began to include overseas expansion. The strong points of the book include why each revolution was a failure for certain class and racial groups, and the limited social changes that could hardly be defined as revolutionary except in Haiti.