Ron Milam

Empire, War and Revolution

Dr. Robert Buzzanco

March 29, 2000

Paterson, Thomas G., Contesting Castro, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994

As we watch the news accounts of the daily, incredibly botched saga of Elian Gonzales, one must ponder all of the “what ifs” regarding Cuba. While not considered an intellectually honest approach to the study of history that is exactly what Paterson has done in Contesting Castro. His thesis is that “this is one that the United States let get away”, and he chronicles the rise of Castro from the early 50’s to the January 1, 1959 revolution. Paterson concludes that the revolution was influenced deeply by the presence of a tremendously corrupt and malicious regime under Fulgencio Batista, but that the ultimate outcome and estrangement from the U.S. was because of the anti-U.S. nature of Castro, as well as his flamboyance and provocative methods. This review will discuss that thesis, and offer some alternatives based upon the history of Cuba as presented by Paterson.

The 26 July Movement (M-26-7) of Castro, his brother Raul, and Che Guevara had its roots in Mexico and the U.S., but it began long before the Granma set sail from Mexico on Nov. 25, 1956. With Batista’s election in 1940, which Paterson claims was probably an honest election by Latin American standards, the regime began its economic dependency on the U.S., and it never let up through his subsequent years. Electric, telephone, and sugar mills were predominately owned by Americans, and Batista encouraged investment far beyond that which was necessary to maintain a strong economic base, but rather allowed his country to become essentially an economic satellite. Batista served only four years, retired to his Daytona Beach home, then came back in a well-planned and American supported coup in 1952. Throughout this period, the U.S. was heavily involved in Cuban economics, politics, and military affairs, and the U.S. Ambassador was said to be the most important man on the island – more important even than the president of Cuba.

So why then a revolution? Paterson makes the case that Cuba was one of the most successful economies in Latin America, with only Venezuela having higher per capita income. Using the luxuries index, they were way ahead of all southern hemisphere countries in terms of telephones and television sets. Even medical care, food consumption and literacy was high, so something else was happening that caused a nation to accept a new military dictatorship: tremendous corruption and a wave of military actions against common citizens that caused even the U.S. State Department to begin to question whether the Batista regime was in the U.S.’s best interests. As one Batista cabinet member stated: “not to be rich was a humiliation. It was not considered scandalous to sell oneself.”

Castro sensed the unrest, and began recruiting money and support in the United States during 1955. Intelligence being sent to Washington by Ambassador Arthur Gardner indicated that Castro and others were a threat to the Batista government, and that U.S. military aid was necessary to keep him in power. Washington’s response was to accept Gardner’s formal resignation after the 1956 Eisenhower re-election, and to replace him with Earl Smith, who became a staunch Batista supporter after a few months. Thus Paterson concludes that neither Ambassador got support from Washington to “prop up” the regime, or even to take notice that the Batista government was showing signs of potential collapse.

Enter the Communism issue. Batista had endorsed the rhetoric of the Cold War, and that gave him instant credibility in Washington, but Ambassador Smith needed more damage to get Washington’s attention. The focus then shifted to whether Castro was a Communist, and the generally accepted information was that he was not. Paterson devotes much of the book to this issue. Although one can argue that it is immaterial, he feels it’s critical to his thesis. What developed was a split between the Embassy and Washington over the threat of a Castro-communist takeover, and reluctance on the part of Washington to believe that such an inevitability was profoundly worse than the current corrupt, military dictatorship of Batista. Paterson cites an even bigger problem in Washington of Eisenhower and Dulles being preoccupied with Hungary, Suez Canal, Sputnik and the Cold War in general to worry about a Southern hemisphere “hegemonee” that had always been intricately tied to the U.S. He also cites Eisenhower and Dulles’ deteriorating health problems as indicators of ambivalence. One can probably accept Paterson’s concept of this ambivalence in light of other pressing issues, but it is too simplistic to think that the State Department “blew off” its Ambassador because they were too busy or sick. More likely, Batista was seen as expendable, his regime was becoming expensive in terms of military hardware, and he was somewhat of an international embarrassment as word of his torture, assassination, executions and generally “bad guy” image spread throughout the hemisphere.

Herbert Matthews of the New York Times began a series of articles based upon interviews he had conducted with the Castro brothers as well as Che Guevara, and sentiment in the U.S. for the revolution began too shift. Smith’s Communist rhetoric was intensified, but Batista’s performance got worse, and without support from the embassy, the U.S. cut off military aid to Cuba. This was more than just guns, because an order for planes was ready for shipment, and against Smith’s request, the arms ceased to flow to Batista, and the end began to appear. However, no one in Washington or Havana believed that Batista would fall as quickly as he did, and Paterson concludes that the U.S. was not upset, even though Castro was still somewhat of an unknown. The “third force” never materialized as the U.S. sought to again put its stamp of approval on the revolution.

The book essentially ends with Castro’s triumphant entrance into Havana, although Paterson produced a short essay on the results of Castro’s coming to power on other Cold War issues. But Paterson fails to make a case for the Cuban revolution being a repulsion of American economic control over a small Caribbean island, and instead concentrates on Castro and Batista as leaders. Perhaps he believes the economic hegemony aspects are too obvious to need amplification, but this failure to emphasize the U.S. role allows the reader to ignore the fact that Bastista was “our guy” until he went too far. Thus the U.S. influence gets lost in the Castro-Batista personality issue, which simplifies the results beyond belief.

This book provides interesting history on the rise of Castro, including anecdotes about Castro the pitcher and Castro the charmer. But it fails to focus on the deficiencies of U.S. economic policies and concentrates instead on U.S. failures in diplomatic attention, which is difficult to accept.

Forty-one years later, the U.S. trades with China, North Korea and Vietnam, but the embargo is still in place with Cuba, and we can’t accept a child’s need to be with his father having precedent over smearing Castro. This book doesn’t help answer the question of how the U.S. can continue to ignore a country 90 miles from its shores. That’s the book I want to read; that’s the current issue that should concern Americans.