History 6393 – Empire, War and Revolution

Readings for January 19, 2000

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. By Paul Kennedy. (New York: Vintage Books, c. 1987. Pp. 677.)

Christos Frentzos

In The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy examines the leading nations of the last 500 years, detailing their ascension and decline relative to each other. The book concentrates on the interaction between economics and strategy as states competed to increase their wealth and power. Kennedy’s main argument is that the relative strengths of the world’s leading nations are never constant, and are continually waxing and waning. The most important factor which has influenced the rise and fall of the various powers, both economically and militarily, is the size and potential of its technological and industrial base. Throughout history the side with the more flourishing productive base has repeatedly won the large, drawn-out, Great Power conflicts. Since that has been the case for the last five hundred years, the author makes a successful argument that it will continue to be the most important element in determining which nations will lead the world in the twenty-first century.

Kennedy begins by discussing the "European Miracle," the process of economic development and technological innovation which gradually transformed Europe into the commercial and military leader in world affairs by around 1500. One of the most important reasons for this unique growth in Europe at this time was the continent’s pluralism. Unlike other areas and nations, Europe lacked a uniform authority, which could attempt to halt new commercial development. There was no central government to interfere with industry and no systematic and universal plundering of businessmen and entrepreneurs by tax collectors to retard the economy. As a result, the combination of economic laissez-faire, political and military pluralism and intellectual liberty produced an atmosphere conducive to economic growth which in turn affected the development of the nation-state, capable of supporting a large, powerful army which now became necessary for security and expansion.

From the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century, five great powers rose to prominence in Europe: France, England, Russia, Prussia and the Habsburg Empire. During this period France became the most powerful European nation and England grew to become the greatest of the European maritime empires. In addition, Russia also began a period of rapid expansion during the eighteenth century as it increased its holdings in both Europe and Asia.

The financial and geopolitical position of the powers had a significant impact on their growth. First, money was needed to wage war and most nations accumulated money by borrowing it. Money was then spent on developing the military. This raising and spending of money fanned the development of Western capitalism and of the nation-state itself. Second, a nation’s strategic location was also a major consideration in determining its power potential. A country that had to defend one front held a distinct advantage over one that had to defend two or more. Likewise, a nation that shared a common border with a weak state was safer than one that bordered a powerful one. Finally, a nation that could secure additional resources from overseas held a distinct advantage over those who could not.

During the nineteenth century, the international system changed once again. The productive forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution, the relative stability of Europe, and the modernization of military and naval technology favored Britain more than anyone else. Britain benefited so much from the general economic and geopolitical trends of the age that it became a different type of power from the rest. This was the period of British hegemony. Britain possessed the largest and most powerful navy, they had a huge colonial empire and they were the world’s leading financial nation.

The conflicts fought during the nineteenth century, including the American Civil War, proved how significant the Industrial Revolution was on the development of warfare and national power. The powers which were defeated were those that failed to adapt to the so-called "military revolution" of the mid-nineteenth century. This included the acquisition of new weapons, the mobilizing and equipping of large armies, the use of improved communications offered by the railway, the steamship, and the telegraph, and a productive industrial base to sustain the armed forces. Such an international scheme obviously favored Britain, the leading economic power of the age, and hurt the non-industrialized peasant societies like Russia and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.

Clearly then, as the dawn of the twentieth century approached, economic strength equaled military strength. The First World War proved the perfect example. The international alliance system that existed prior to 1914, guaranteed that any future conflict would not be decided quickly, and meant that victory in a long, drawn-out fight would go to the side whose combination of both military/naval and financial/industrial/technological resources was the greatest. As a result the Central Powers, although they possessed an excellent fighting force and successfully defeated Russia in the East, could not defeat the Western powers during the First World War. The allies were far too superior in economic and industrial production, especially after the United States entered the war. The Second World War continued the trend. Again, although the Axis powers were successful early on, the Allies’ productive superiority ensured their victory in the long run. The Allies possessed twice the manufacturing strength, three times the war potential and three times the national income of the Axis powers.

The post 1945 period saw the emergence of a bipolar world with the United States and the Soviet Union emerging as the only two superpowers. Given the extraordinarily favorable economic and strategic position which the U.S. occupied, and with the traditional great powers fading away, it was only natural for the United States to move into the vacuum which their absence created. One of the reasons for this rapid economic expansion of U.S. interests abroad was the perceived threat of communism. The U.S. hoped to contain the USSR and her communist allies through the policy of containment. To ensure the political stability of Western Europe and Asia, American policy makers embarked on a massive program of U.S. economic aid to rebuild the shattered industries, farms and cities of Europe and Japan. American policy makers felt this was the best way to aid Europe and Japan and make them less susceptible to communist doctrines of class struggle and revolution. In addition, it would also help to readjust the power balances in America’s favor. Thus, much of America’s economic policy after 1945 was a means to an end, not an end in itself.

The second half of the twentieth century saw the U.S. in the same position as Britain the century before. The "number one" power, which had achieved its rank due to its superior economic and productive capabilities, now had to expand its military commitments abroad in order to protect its interests, resources and markets. Such an expanded military role naturally put more pressure on the economy and ultimately more and more resources were diverted to military spending. This in turn reduced the amount of capital available for domestic investment and growth and lead to a relative decrease in the nation’s economic strength. As other nations began to develop their industries and their economies grew, the "number one" power found it harder to compete, leading to heavier taxes, slower growth, and a weakening capacity to bear the burdens of defense. Kennedy uses the term "imperial overstretch" to describe this phenomena.

Kennedy concludes by noting that the United States is no different than other great powers of the past. Unless it can create a rough balance between the competing demands of defense, consumption and investment, it will not be able to preserve its status for long. In order to remain competitive, a nation must simultaneously provide military security for its national interests, satisfy the socioeconomic needs of its citizenry, and ensure sustained growth. As the last five hundred years have proven, uneven rates of economic growth sooner or later lead to shifts in the world’s political and military balances.

I found Kennedy’s arguments very convincing. He makes a good case for the importance of economic power and how all other forms of power, especially military power, are impossible without it. From the examples he provides it becomes readily apparent that as far as the international system is concerned, wealth and power, or economic strength and military strength, are always relative and will continue to be so. In some respects, Kennedy’s book reinforces many of the arguments made by revisionist historians of American foreign policy such as Thomas McCormick and William Appleman Williams. These historians recognized the importance of economic realities and tried to integrate them into the study of American foreign policy. Since this book was originally published in 1987, it would be interesting to see a second edition that would incorporate all of the dramatic changes that have occurred since then. I would like to hear Kennedy’s thoughts on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the continuing rise of China, and what all this may mean for the future of international relations.