José Angel Hernández

HIST: 6393; "Empire, War and Revolution"

February 22, 2000

Emily S. Rosenberg. Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), Pp. 258 + Bibliographic essay & Index.

Emily Rosenberg contends that "American expansion was dominated by and ideology of 'liberal developmentalism' that used the rhetoric of peace, prosperity, and democracy to promote Americanizing the world in the name of modernization." From the 1890s to 1945, "America's economic and cultural influence spread worldwide," simultaneously infiltrating the many crevices of foreign countries and markets alike. According to Rosenberg, "this American dream of high technology and mass consumption was both promoted and accompanied by an ideology...[of] liberal-developmentalism... this ideology matured during the twentieth century...[an ideology] that merged nineteenth-century liberal tenets with the historical experience of America's own development, elevating the beliefs and experiences of America's unique historical time and circumstance into developmental laws thought to be applicable everywhere."

This ideology, according to the author, is a term used to describe "the system of beliefs, values, fears, prejudices, reflexes, and commitments--in sum, the social consciousness of the Americans--which generally dominated the expansion of America's influence into foreign lands." Moreover, "ideology is viewed as a 'political weapon, manipulated consciously in ongoing struggles for legitimacy and power, as an instrument for creating and controlling organizations." In the context of previous class discussions, particularly in terms of internalized notions of North American superiority and racism, one is struck with the historical thread that connects the ideas and practices of each generation and how those concepts are then weaved and contorted to fit the mold of a justifiable international expansionism. Indeed, Rosenberg herself concludes, "most Americans believed that Protestant Christianity was a spiritual precondition for modernization... [thus] religious duty and national destiny fused together," an idea reminiscent of Max Weber's famous thesis.

The ideology of liberal-developmentalism, according to the author, can be broken down into five major features: "(1) belief that other nations could and should replicate America’s own developmental experience; (2) faith in private free enterprise; (3) support for free or open access for trade and investment; (4) promotion of free flow of information and culture; and (5) growing acceptance of governmental activity to protect private enterprise and to stimulate and regulate American participation in international economic and cultural exchange." This ideology, particularly during the so-called "Great Depression" of 1929, ignited the stagnating economy of the US during one of the worst financial slumps of the century. Private economic expansion overseas and corporate determination decided—early on—the direction that US policy would take in terms of monopolizing various companies and, in effect, legalizing a number of "cartels."

In tune with Thomas Ferguson’s article, Rosenberg essentially states that previous notions of the "Great Depression" warrant some revisions and reconsideration, chiefly in terms of benevolent policies geared towards workers and the dispossessed. Ferguson states, for instance, that "a clear view of the New Deal’s world historical uniqueness and significance comes only when one breaks with most of the commentaries of the last thirty years, goes back to primary sources, and attempts to analyze the New Deal as a whole in the light of explicit theories about industrial structure, party competition, and public policy. Then what stands out is the novel type of political coalition that Roosevelt built. At the center of this coalition, however, are not the workers, blacks, and poor who have preoccupied liberal commentators, but something else: a new "historical bloc (in Gramsci's phrase) of capital-intensive industries, investment banks, and internationally oriented commercial banks." Furthermore, "This bloc constitutes the basis of the New Deals great and, in world history, utterly unique achievement: its ability to accommodate millions of mobilized workers amidst world depression."

The genius of Rosenberg, if I may call it that, is her ability to synthesize various works and ideas current during this period: both contemporary and historical. What she fails to provide, however, are some of the other variables intertwined with questions of overseas expansion and the corporate decisions that took place as a result of these variables and how those ideas found their way to the popular culture and ideas of the average American. This is to say that the connections between the liberal developmentalists and the government's programs supporting an open door policy do not connect with the popular ideas of the people themselves.

With these few critiques aside, though, Rosenberg and Ferguson's theses together overthrow the historical straw man of popular depression-era history. Yet, the more we examine the origins and outcomes of the Great Depression of 1929 the more we discover that diplomatic history has yet to fill in the historiographical void of numerous New Deal Policies, especially the effects thereafter. For instance, Robert Freeman Smith's article on the historical origins of the Pax Americana reveal yet another facet of foreign relations and its implications for an informal overseas empire, particularly the US's military policy and its declining capability in the middle of the depression. In discussing the Republican administration prior to Roosevelt, Smith states that "they were deeply involved in the task of developing and refining the tactics of informal empire--the Pax Americana." Additionally, these officials "were trying to utilize nonmilitary tactics...[which in turn] placed limitations on the extent of governmental involvement (or meddling)." Ironically, however, in the absence of a "strong" military, capital investments overseas, particularly in Latin America, served as the foundation of later underdevelopment on those countries that would later become dependent on the world market economy.

In the context of Latin American countries the policies that emerged following the depression of 1929 have yet to be analyzed in their totality: economic (including corporate), military, cultural, diplomatic, international, and ethnocentric ideas consistent with the times. Here I am simply saying that we have yet to receive a panoramic picture of US foreign policy towards Latin America that encompasses the various aspects mentioned above. A few questions are worth mentioning. What factors were involved in North American policies toward Mexico before and after the Good Neighbor Policy? How was the US able to reconcile its notions of atmospheric solidarity with Latin America while simultaneously rounding up Mexicans and Mexican Americans like cattle and forcing them across its southern border? What factors were involved in the occupation of Haiti and Nicaragua, especially in terms of diplomacy, defaults (loans), and military capabilities? What were the advantages and disadvantages of the Good Neighbor Policy for Latin America? In the words of Walter LaFeber, is there a direct correlation between underdevelopment in Central America and the rise of revolutions three and four decades later in that region? Finally, how crucial was Latin America's support to the United States on the eve of WWII?