Roy Vu

HIST 6394-Empire, War and Revolution

Dr. Buzzanco

March 22, 2000

A Review of Andrew Rotter’s The Path to Vietnam

Rather than narrowly focusing on how the United States got entangled in the quagmire of Vietnam, Andrew Rotter asserts a global projection of American foreign policy that compromised liberal capitalism to resuscitate the British and Japanese economies during the early postwar years that eventually led to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. He explains a network of economic and political reasons that force U.S. policymakers to eventually deal with the question of Vietnam. His book, The Path to Vietnam, provides an in-depth outlook on how the U.S. shifts from its initial policies of liberal capitalism and democracy to reluctant acceptance of European colonialism during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The significance of Rotter’s work is how he connects the multitude of problems- the U.S. dollar gap, the devalued British sterling, the need for West Germany’s rearmament, the capitulation of China to communism, the economic importance of European control over their Asian colonies, the need for Japan to have noncommunist markets in Asia, the outbreak of the Korean War, and the support of France’s Indochina policies to maintain its prestige- and relate them to the steps leading to U.S. affairs in Vietnam.

Rotter effectively describes this elaborate scheme of U.S. Cold War policies to rebuild Western Europe especially Germany, contain communism in Asia, rebuild Japan’s economy and spread the ideals of liberalism and capitalism as alternatives to communism. Rotter assesses the triangular trade balance between the U.S., Great Britain and Malaya. Since U.S. policymakers deemed the recovery of British economy as extremely important for the survival of liberal capitalism, they recognize the British colonial authority over Malaya. In order to boost the British sterling currency, U.S. purchases Malayan tin, rubber and other natural resources and pays Malaya in U.S. dollars. In turn, Malaya would buy British goods and purchase them in U.S. dollars. As a result, the British accepted these dollars as payment for their surplus exports to the other sterling nations (Rotter, 55). Thus the British sterling increases in value and allows Great Britain to repay its massive war loans to the U.S. as well. However, to protect this triangular trade balance, the U.S. must support the British crackdown on Malaysian communist forces. The U.S. remains compel to contain communism in Southeast Asia since its geographic proximity and the fear of the domino theory threatened British Malaya. Interestingly enough, U.S. limits production of synthetic rubber produced by American companies so the government could purchase natural rubber from Malaya.

Rotter argues that the rebuilding of Japan’s economy has a direct effect to the eventual U.S. involvement in Vietnam as well. With Mao’s communist victory in China in 1949, the Truman administration reacts with a containment policy against communism and asserts the need for Japan to be surrounded with pro-capitalist countries in Asia. In particular, Southeast Asia plays a vital role as a trading partner with Japan. Albeit U.S. did not wholeheartedly support France’s colonial policies of Indochina, American advisors believed a French-controlled Vietnam under former emperor, Bao Dai, remained a better option and a lesser of two evils than the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh. Thus, with the French fighting the Viet Minh for control of Vietnam, the issue of Southeast Asia remains central to Japan’s economic recovery according to American policymakers.

However, Rotter states that by 1949, U.S. objectives in Europe appeared critical. With the British suffering through an economic crisis, the U.S. and many Western European nations had pledged themselves to mutual military assistance through the creation of NATO with a strong French presence in Europe (99). Rotter explains that, “American policymakers soon recognized that the war in Indochina demanded the diversion of French resources to Southeast Asia and thus prevented the revival of French power in Europe” (99). France suffered heavy casualties and sever economic losses in its war against Ho Chi Minh and his forces. Soon, the French could no longer maintain its manpower and resources in Vietnam and naturally, looked toward the U.S. for military and economic aids.

As a principle of liberal capitalism, and to avoid the same historical mistakes, the U.S. calls for a rebuilding of Germany’s economy and the rearmament of its military. France opposes the rearmament of German forces especially since many French people still freshly recalled Germany’s invasion of France less than a decade ago. Rotter points out that a diversion of French troops stuck in a long, drawn-out war in Vietnam did not allow France the capability to have a strong military presence at home to be comfortable enough against the rearmament of Germany. Thus, he states that “American policymakers were concerned about not only the fate of the French in Indochina, but about the spread of communism to all of Southeast Asia and its implications for the recovery of Japan and Great Britain” (102). Since the fight against communism in Southeast Asia directly affects the economic well beings of Great Britain and Japan, the U.S. began its economic aid in 1951 to the beleaguered French forces in Indochina.

Rotter depicts a panoramic view on U.S. foreign policies during the early Cold War as the Vietnam question looms as a growing headache for the U.S. government. More stunningly, he manages to incorporate all the economic woes of Western Europe and connect them to the political problems in the Far East that alarmed the Truman administration and forces American policymakers not only to compromise on the ideals of liberal capitalism but to get deeper involved in Southeast Asia. Rotter provides a sense of what the U.S. policymakers were thinking when the British economy suffers mightily, China falls to communism, Japan’s needs for noncommunist countries to trade and rebuild its economy, and France’s troubles to contain communism in Southeast Asia. For the U.S. policymakers, American aid to the French in Vietnam makes a logical progressive step to secure the natural resources of British Malaya and Dutch East Indies, provide Japan with a liberal capitalist market, curb communist infiltration from China, and save French prestige and allowing France to divert its troops back to Europe in time for the rearmament of Germany.

This demonstrates the differences between post-World War II U.S. foreign policy in Asia with the U.S. diplomacy if the Far East after World War I. Akira Iriye clearly asserts in his book, After Imperialism, that U.S. policymakers in the 1920s took a wait-and-see approach to China and Japan but supporting the Kuomintang to defeat the Chinese communists. However, U.S. policymakers and Western countries did not deemed China and Japan as equal powers. Yet, at the aftermath of World War II, the American government genuinely feared that China would capitulate to Mao’s communist forces and the U.S. also made a concerted effort to rebuild Japan and create a liberal capitalist economic model. John Dower provides an in-depth look at Japan under U.S. military occupation from 1945-1952 in his work, Embracing Defeat. He states that the Japanese, horribly devastated by the war and occupied by American forces, managed to adapt the capitalist model and grew economically at such a rapid pace that by 1979 a book labeled Japan as the number one economic superpower. However, Dower relates that all the energies behind Japanese pride and honor shifted to the economic aspects of the country and led to its financial and technological successes. The Japanese feared the rearmament of its military after the end of U.S. occupation due to Article Nine of the constitution, and the fresh memory of the war. Likewise, in the political arena, Japan maintained its imperial figurehead under Emperor Hirohito under a constitution with a limited democracy.

Overall, Andrew Rotter’s The Path to Vietnam gives an interesting outlook on the U.S. policymakers’ perception of the importance of Vietnam on a global scale. Rotter manages to point out the paranoia of communism, and the fear of a collapsed liberal capitalist world system that would create a dismal upheaval in the U.S. economy. More than just a singular reason, he provides a multitude of factors and ties them together to demonstrate how the U.S. made a mistake in its initial involvement in Vietnam.