Theresa R. Jach
History 6393 – Empire, War, and Revolution
Buzzanco
February 17, 2000
Charles Tansill’s America Goes to War, published in 1938, came at a time when the United States was coping with the Depression.[1] Historians were looking at the Great War with a critical eye. Considering the staggering loss of life during the war, it is no wonder that some would assign blame to American leaders for getting involved in the war when neutrality was the country’s professed policy. In the preface, Tansill claims to have “no thesis to prove nor any viewpoint to exploit.” In spite of this claim, Tansill’s basic thesis is that although the U.S. claimed to be neutral, they were not. He also has a strong viewpoint that American and British leaders share the blame for the U.S. entry into the war. The author used sources ranging from official U.S. Department of State documents and British Foreign Office documents to German Naval Archives. He makes extensive use of the Nye Committee reports.
Tansill begins his book with an examination of the American public’s favorable view of England. Before the outbreak of war in Europe, public opinion in America was decidedly against Germany. The militaristic Germans were not to be trusted. Most Americans had friendly feelings toward England and felt a shared bond of Anglo heritage. Americans also had cordial feelings for the French. Tansill writes that these feelings became more pronounced when war erupted. Since Americans were pro-Ally, neutrality was a mere façade. “Although President Wilson called for American neutrality in thought as well as in deed, there were few Americans in public life who paid any heed to such a summons.” (p. 16)
Loans to the Allies, and its refusal to stop the exportation of arms by private business showed how biased toward the Allies the United States had become. Tansill also examines the differences in the U.S. acceptance of British violations of international law, while reacting strongly against German actions. The British blockade of foodstuffs to Germany was a clear violation of international law. Yet the U.S. suggested they lift the blockade in exchange for Germany’s halt of submarine warfare. For the United States to stand by and allow armed British merchant ships into its harbors violated international law. If the U.S. had threatened the British with closing ports to armed merchant vessels, we could have wielded more influence over England and prevented their violations of U.S. trade rights. American leaders sent sharp notes to England when British ships interfered with American trade. When they condemned Germany’s submarine warfare the United States showed its biased, decidedly un-neutral stance.
Since the sinking of the Lusitania and the loss of American lives pushed the U.S. down the road to entry into the war, Tansill looks for ways the U.S. could have prevented the tragedy. Tansill writes that if the United States had not allowed the British violation of international law or at the least had warned Americans not to travel on those armed vessels, U.S. involvement in the war could have been avoided. With no American citizens aboard, the Lusitania would have not been so important to the U.S.
Tansill is more harshly critical of the U.S. and British leadership than of the Germans. Tansill seems to be an apologist for Germany. He criticizes the United States for not being as neutral as he thinks they should have been. Tansill questions the skill and even the character of the American and British leaders. He blames them for drawing the U.S. into the war. He is particularly critical of Colonel House, who Tansill feels held undue influence over President Wilson.
Wilson is painted as timid at best and too open to House’s influence at worst. Tansill writes that Wilson was responsible for the World War because he followed the lead of Lansing, rather than Bryan. (p. 258) The President would have followed a path of conciliation if he were not “led astray by his advisors.” (p. 649-650) Tansill leaves out Wilson’s religious tendency. Wilson was a “Christian idealist…that almost always tended to judge policies on a basis of whether they were right by Christian standards.” (Link essay p. 517) In addition, Wilson’s personal feelings made him anti-German. (Wilhelm Shulte-Nordholt essay p. 553) Reducing Wilson to a timid, easily swayed leader, takes away his active responsibility for U.S. policy.
Tansill’s secondary thesis is that ‘big business’ did not sway Wilson in the hundred days leading up to U.S. entry into the War. (p. 657) The Nye Committee tried to prove a link between U.S. banks pressuring or conspiring to force the United States into the war, in order to protect their assets. Since the Nye Committee failed to prove its allegations, Tansill points to this as proof that there was no influence from big business. This conclusion ignores the fact that Wilson could not have been blind to the economic advantage of munitions trade and loans to Allies to American business and the economy as a whole. Big business would not have needed to exert any overt pressure during the hundred days, to have had an influence on Wilson’s policies. Even Tansill writes, “as far back as August, 1914, it was apparent to many observers that the United States would probably incline towards the nations that absorbed her huge exports and thereby brought her prosperity.” (p. 133) German submarine warfare may have given an immediate cause to go to war, but other factors, such as U.S. business interests had cumulative impact. Whether or not ‘big business’ directly influenced Wilson during those critical hundred days is irrelevant. They had a deeper influence in the years leading up to 1917.
Despite Tansill’s conclusions, there were larger economic and social forces at play. The United States did not enter a World War because of the ‘evil’ influence of Colonel House and his ‘minions.’ It was impossible for the United States to remain neutral when public opinion favored the British and expressed outrage at the Germans. When not only individual business interests were at risk, but the American economy as well, the United States had a stake in protecting these interests. The need to protect and promote an open market in Europe was a cornerstone of the ‘democracy’ that Wilson wanted to make the world ‘safe for.’ Tansill seems to believe U.S. could have avoided involvement in the War. Yet, given the myriad of social and economic factors involved, it seems doubtful the United States could have remained neutral. Tansill’s evidence supports this conclusion, even if it is not the conclusion he reached.