History
6393
Review
#4
March
1, 2000
Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978)
In Allies of a Kind, Christopher Thorne
examined the working relationship between the United States and Britain during
World War II. In order to give a
complete account, however, he of necessity included the relationships of those
two nations with the Soviet Union, France, China, India, Australia, New
Zealand, and the nations of Southeast Asia, as well as the reactions of all
those nations to the threat posed by Japan.
The resulting volume not only examined the geo-political and economic
factors that led to conflict in the Pacific, but also the role those factors played
both in the conduct of the war and in the terms of the peace. Thorne presented the issues upon which the
United States and Britain agreed, but more significantly, he commented on the
areas of conflict between the two nations that sometimes set them at
cross-purposes. While never so critical
as to destroy their relationship, those differences served as indicators that
the two nations pursued goals quite at odds one with the other, and that they
viewed their positions in the post bellum
world in quite contrary terms.
Thorne studied the war in great detail, but always with regard to
several important themes he considered crucial to a better understanding of the
relationship between the United States and Britain.
First, he studied the changing nature of the power relationship between the United States and Britain and how that change affected the national psyche of each country. By the time the United States entered World War II, Britain’s ability to wage war was dangerously extended, both in terms of manpower availability and industrial output. The eventual American military presence, as well as its ability to produce limitless war material, soon relegated Britain to a secondary position in the fight against Germany on the western front, quite at odds with its longtime status as the last bastion against German domination of Europe. The inability to produce additional troops or material of great consequence, coupled with the wishes of the United States as the offended party to lead the Pacific war against Japan, cast Britain in a supporting role in that conflict. Many of the British people, unaware of the new power relationship, took the United States to task for its heavy handed ways, but Winston Churchill was as much a pragmatist as he was a nationalist. He understood Britain’s subordinate position, and above almost all else tied the success of Britain to the ability of the United States to wage war. As an example of the depth of his decision, he told General Charles de Gaulle, “There is something you ought to know: each time we have to choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the open sea. Each time I have to choose between you and Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt.”
Roosevelt and Churchill, both of whom possessed domineering personalities, approached foreign policy decision-making in different ways. Churchill sometimes insisted on establishing policy concerning issues about which he had strong feelings but generally permitted the Foreign Office to at least make their opinions known. Roosevelt, on the other hand, confident of his “hail fellow, well met!” interpersonal style, acted as his own Secretary of State, much to the dismay of the State Department. Roosevelt’s decision to keep Harry S Truman ignorant of the atomic bomb, as well as his belief that Joseph Stalin could be turned by kindness are indicative both of his secretive nature and his confidence in his own persuasive abilities.
One of the most serious disagreements between the United States and Britain occurred with regard to the post-war disposition of the Southeast Asian colonies of the British Empire. Roosevelt was a strong anti-colonialist (especially with regard to the colonies of other nations), and desired that the clause of the Atlantic Charter concerning “self-determination” be honored. Churchill, normally acquiescent in the face of the wants and wishes of the United States, in this case adamantly insisted on the restoration of the British colonies. In fact, for one of the few times during the war, and in an about face from the previously quoted remark to de Gaulle, he supported the restoration of Indochina to France, hoping that such support would strengthen his case concerning the British colonies.
Both the United States and Britain recognized the importance of the Chinese and the Soviets with regard to the ultimate defeat of the Japanese, but the tone of their foreign policy toward the two nations differed considerably. Both the United States and Britain looked to the Chinese military to maintain a second front against the Japanese, thereby reducing the numbers of Japanese free to face the Allies in other parts of the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Similarly, both the United States and Britain desired the entrance of the immense Soviet army into the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. The British Foreign Service, perhaps based generally on the legacy of the strength of empire and specifically on their long experience in China, seasoned their diplomatic efforts with more than just a touch of world-weary pragmatism. The United States, however, operating under the personal, charismatic leadership of Roosevelt, tended to look at the relationship with the two nations in more positive terms. Hence, the lack of surprise among the British, and the dismay of the United States when faced with the corrupt government of Chiang Kai-shek and his disfunctional Chinese Army, and the postponement of the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war until its very conclusion.
In the book, Thorne dealt peripherally with several issues of concern to me. The first issue is that of the imperial presidency of Roosevelt and its ramifications not only for the World War II generation but for the entire world since then. It seems that Roosevelt took charge of foreign policy and acted in such a secretive manner not because he was paranoid, and not even so much because he had no confidence in the State Department (although that did seem to be a factor). No, it was simply because of his supreme confidence in his own abilities (especially his powers of persuasion that had contributed so much to his political success), coupled with his highly developed gamesmanship skills (never let them see you sweat, and never show your hand) that led him to act as he did. Such behavior affected his relationship with Churchill (as when he insisted on meeting with Stalin in private), led to what Thorne considered bad decision-making in the days prior to his death (he insisted to the last that concessions to Stalin and the Soviets would be repaid in goodwill and Soviet cooperation against Japan), and made Truman’s ascendancy to the presidency much more difficult than necessary.
The second issue that Thorne forced me to consider was the position of Japan in the world viv a vis the United States in the interwar years. It is not, I think, forcing the analogy too much to consider Japan the Far Eastern equivalent of the United States in the time period leading up to Pearl Harbor. If Japanese success in wars against Russia and China left their status in doubt, the Washington Conference served to remove all questions concerning Japan’s legitimacy as a true world-class economic and military power. Just as the United States considered the Caribbean as an American pond, so did the Japanese consider the South and Southeast Pacific as their bailiwick. They even developed the Japanese equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine to justify their claim to hegemony in the area. The problem arose, however, when the interests of Japan and the United States collided. I in no way confer legitimacy on Japanese military expeditions into Manchuria, the scale of which dwarfed any American interventions prior to that time, but the fact remains that the United States historically never hesitated to flex their military muscles to further their national agenda. With regard to the attack on Pearl Harbor…and I again neither approve of nor defend Japanese actions…it is a certainty that the United States Marine Corps probably gave little warning in advance of wading ashore all those times in the Caribbean and Central America. Perhaps it is all a function of scale and flag.
Allies of a Kind gave a realistic account of the relationship between two nations separated by more than a common language. It insists in no uncertain terms that, perhaps as early as the date of America’s entrance into the war, and most assuredly by the date of the war’s end, in terms of power and influence on a global scale, the United States and the Soviet Union had much more in common that did the United States and Britain. Additionally, Thorne suggested that had the war not forced such an alliance on the United States and Britain, that the differences in their worldview, especially their colonial policies, would have led to further estrangement.