Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson. The Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft

of Thomas Jefferson. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Two images of America endure in the nation’s collective imagination: John Winthrop’s "City upon a Hill" and that of America as the guardian "making the world safe for democracy." These conflicting images form a continuity in American history, a continuing search to discover which image best defines the nation. Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, in The Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (hereafter referred to as Empire), contend that this fundamental unresolved debate characterizes American foreign policy: Will the nation be an "exemplar of liberty" or be a "crusader for liberty"? This conflict has produced cycles of isolationism and reform that distinctly influence the relationship of this country to the rest of the world. As these historians state, "In the historic debate over American foreign policy, a consensus seldom existed over the relationship between liberty and the nation’s diplomatic stance. . . .One side of the debate. . .has sought to advance the cause of liberty by remaining separate from the world. Only by avoiding the enormous economic and constitutional threats produced by entangling alliances and foreign wars would America fulfill its mission as an example or asylum for oppressed people everywhere. The other side. . .has taken for granted that free political and economic institutions would flourish in America only if they took root elsewhere, an idea that has underlain much of the crusading impulse in this century." (x) The historians use the diplomatic career of Thomas Jefferson as a symbol to represent the young country’s struggle to determine its relationship to the rest of the world

Tucker and Hendrickson examine critical points in Jefferson’s diplomatic career to delineate the presence of this conflict that influenced his ideology and his actions. Within his statecraft, Jefferson manifests both sides of the debate. From the beginning of his national political career to his service as Washington’s Secretary of State, from the optimism inspired by the Louisiana Purchase during his first Presidential term to the bitter failure of the embargo during the Maritime Crisis that marked his second term, Jefferson struggled to resolve the questions that this conflict raised. In his advocacy of an "Empire of Liberty", which should be more important: "empire" or "liberty"? Was the former simply a means to achieve an end (the latter)? Or, were both an end possible to obtain? Could America exist and thrive in a world of free trade without becoming corrupted by the European systems of power that thrived upon war? How could America establish this trade without ensuing political involvement? Could successful foreign policy be achieved by conflating matters of politics with matters of morality?

Tucker and Hendrickson posit that Jefferson’s foreign policy in 1790, upon assuming the position as George Washington’s Secretary of State, differed greatly from that practiced by European diplomats. Jefferson sought to formulate a policy not driven by "reason of state". Reason of state subjugated all aspects of a country to the survival of the state by whatever means possible. Religious, moral, and political laws could be set aside if the security of the state were threatened. In a foreign policy based upon reason of state, war and foreign policy supersede all else, as these function as the primary agents to preserve the state. Instead, Jefferson posited "peaceable coercion" of other nations by economic and diplomatic means, reasoning that free trade could be established without war and political involvement. His insistence on a different type of foreign policy, among other factors, gave rise to his Republican-Federalist feud with Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton, in Jefferson’s opinion, concentrated far too much upon reason of state and the institutions and ideologies that supported the state. Jefferson abhorred these institutions and ideologies, particularly the waging of war. Jefferson equated war with alliances; alliances with foreign entanglements; and foreign entanglements with corruption of the "pure" American government. The French Revolution raised Jefferson’s hopes that liberty would spread abroad to supplant the monarchical governments based on reason of state. However, the War of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars soon disillusioned him, causing him to turn toward isolationism.

During his first term as President, Jefferson employed his concept of "peaceable coercion" to achieve the Louisiana Purchase, one of the largest land acquisitions ever made without war. Jefferson threatened an alliance with England, and also war with France. The French economy and army, sapped by European warfare and the successful slave revolt on the island of Santo Domingo, could not fulfill Napoleon’s dreams of a western empire. Jefferson’s offer to "purchase" Louisiana offered the French emperor a solution to both his monetary and his military woes. Tucker and Hendrickson point out that both Alexander Hamilton and historian Henry Adams credited the American acquisition of Louisiana more to the failure of Napoleon to quell Santo Domingo revolt than to any incredible statesmanship on Jefferson’s part. Furthermore, these historians contend that the Louisiana Purchase led Jefferson to violate his long-held strict interpretation of the Constitution in order to gain land that would ensure the political survival of the country. Consequently, this makes Jefferson just as guilty of diplomacy for "reason of state" as the Europeans. His success with Louisiana spurred him into a dubious, unsuccessful attempt to gain West Florida from Spain that he justified by assuming a high moral tone, insisting the area was included within the Purchase.

It was precisely this predilection for imbuing practical matters of state with deep moral significance, Tucker and Hendrickson argue, that lead to Jefferson’s greatest diplomatic failure, the Embargo of 1807-1809. Meant to "peaceably coerce" Great Britain into respecting neutral rights of trade and ending the British naval practice of impressment of seaman, Jefferson’s strenuous measure made the negotiations over these issues into an "all-or-nothing" proposition. The embodiment of his moral stance in the embargo and its complete failure forced the United States into a position of destroying its commerce and led the nation directly into the War of 1812, which resolved absolutely nothing about neutral rights of trade or impressement. Throughout his public career, Jefferson maintained that this country would be an "exemplar of liberty", the uncorrupted example to guide the world. Yet, by his second presidential term, he apparently seemed to blur the distinctions between the role of exemplar and the role of crusader. Tucker and Hendrickson conclude: "The conventional contrast of the role of exemplar and crusader has often obscured the affinity that may also exist between the two. . . .A marked self-consciousness about serving as an example to the world may well act, under the proper circumstances, as a standing temptation to go beyond that role. The same sentiments that find gratification or fulfillment by serving in the role of example also sustain to some point the role of crusader." (246)

Walter LaFeber, in assessing the same period in his essay "Foreign Policies of A New Nation: Franklin, Madison, and the ‘Dream Of A New Land to Fulfill with People in Self-Control’, 1750-1804," locates the origins of American foreign policy in the same place as Tucker and Hendrickson: within the political systems developed by the Founding Fathers. However, LaFeber traces its origins to different persons. Benjamin Franklin and James Madison occupy a much larger role for this historian than Thomas Jefferson. LaFeber’s Franklin and Madison agree with Tucker and Hendrickson’s Jefferson that America’s answer to building an empire that could successfully compete with those Europe lay within westward expansion. All three Founding Fathers believed that a republic could be governed effectively even when it covered a large geographic area, contrary to Montesquieu’s admonishment. However, Franklin and Madison believed this for different reasons. Unlike Jefferson’s faith in a weak, decentralized government, Franklin, even in the early years, advocated the need for a strong, central government to control the settlement of the western areas by taxation to regulate revenues and the ability to raise an army. Conversely, Madison’s conviction that America needed a strong central government devolved around the protection of the rights of minorities. He correctly predicted that these minorities would increase exponentially as settlement moved away from the Atlantic coast. With an uncanny prescience into the future, Madison foresaw the agrarian lifestyle would eventually be supplanted by industry. Minorities would become majorities. Unlike Jefferson’s mythical, static America that perhaps never existed anywhere but in his imagination, Madison’s America was dynamic. As LaFeber succinctly states, "Jefferson tended to visualize America as Americans hoped it would be. Madison analyzed and prescribed for Americans as they actually were and would be." (LaFeber, 30)

These three historians agree with William Appleman Williams’ assessment of American foreign policy in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. Just as in the twentieth century, leaders of the early Republic inextricably linked the health and survival of America with events occurring abroad. America’s domestic harmony depended upon her success in her relationships with other world powers. The survival of the nation hinged upon the key points of free trade with all nations and westward expansion within this country. Williams and LaFeber, however, place less emphasis on the role of idealism than do Tucker and Hendrickson. Williams argues that economic needs (Open-Door Policy) drove the expansion westward and America’s foreign policy. In a somewhat chicken-or-the-egg argument, Williams contends that economics shaped idealism, rather than vice-versa. To Williams, the only way this could change would be by leaving an "open-door" for revolution in this country, whereas Tucker and Hendrickson’s Jefferson believed that the answer to problems in American foreign policy was by reform rather than revolution.

Tucker and Hendrickson present a well-written, balanced account of America’s early struggle to find its place in the larger world of international power and politics. Rather than focusing exclusively on Jefferson, the authors also consider the contributions of James Madison and Albert Gallatin in their assessment of the evolution of American foreign policy. Gallatin, in particular, has been largely ignored by most historians, which is puzzling in light of the fact that he played a significant role in government (Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury) during this time. This work at least partially remedies this deficiency. Tucker and Hendrickson also avoid the most severe pitfalls of dealing with mythical figures such as Jefferson and Madison: hagiography and revisionism. Empire presents these men as representatives of a time and of a nation. In a time when men and nations sought to compete in a world organized and defined by empires, these Founding Fathers, like the Puritans, committed themselves to a political experiment that they believed could make a difference. Much like the American Puritans believed that they could demonstrate the worth of a Bible Commonwealth to the rest of the world, these men committed themselves to the political necessity of building an empire, but doing it right, eliminating the pitfalls that had sucked Europe into devastating wars.

Tucker and Hendrickson also correctly argue that Jefferson’s high morals often placed him and the country in untenable positions, from which little or no comprise could be reached. They repeatedly demonstrate that Jefferson often transformed issues of political/diplomatic interest into dramatic moral issues. By pursuing the moral high ground, Jefferson presented these issues in terms of "black-and-white", good versus evil, leaving no room to negotiate.

Empire also adds greatly to the understanding of several ongoing conflicts in American history: Hamilton versus Jefferson, Federalism versus Republicanism, reform versus isolation. Is America to be "the city upon a hill" or the righteous crusader for liberty? Or both? Is it possible to have an "Empire of Liberty"? Or, are the two mutually exclusive? These historians find no simple, easy answers. Rather, they theorize that these opposing factors ebb and flow in cycles throughout the nation’s history, with one idea usually preponderant for roughly a generation before the currents reverse. Also, the book correctly emphasizes the importance of Napoleon in the formulation of U.S foreign policy between 1798-1815. As much as America deplored the "corrupt" emperor of France, he nevertheless was an unavoidable political reality.

Empire contains only a few minor weaknesses. Tucker and Hendrickson experience some problems switching back and forth between their narrative and their critical analysis. Often the interposition of the two jars the reader with its abrupt transition. It might have been more effective for these historians to present their narrative first, and then their political and ideological analysis. This format would offer more continuity within the chapters. Also, the organization of the chapters seems choppy. Several chapters are only five or six pages long; these chapters could have been combined into longer ones. At times, each chapter seems to be an essay meant to stand independently of other chapters. This structure leads to the repetition of some information constantly throughout the book, which can be irritating.

Despite these relatively minor flaws, Empire makes a valuable contribution to the history of the origins of American foreign policy. Its thoughtful examination and evaluation of Jefferson’s attempts to resolve the conflicts between empire and liberty, isolation and reform proffer illumination into the continuing process by which America establishes and maintains its relationship to the rest of the world.