Ron Milam

February 2, 2000

Empire, War & Revolution

William Earl Weeks, Building the Continental Empire, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996. ppix-166 + suggested reading & index.

Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. ppix-129 + bibliography + index.

As many authors have noted, John O’Sullivan did not live to get “credit” for his famous phrase “manifest destiny.” Rather, he died in 1895, during a period of great territorial expansion, and the phrase was, apparently, not credited to him until 1927. Nevertheless, the phrase has been written about for many years, and the two referenced books approach the subject from different, though complimentary ways. In reviewing the two books, it seems appropriate to discuss them thematically, rather than individually, even though both books approach the subject chronologically. One could choose many aspects of manifest destiny in such a discussion; the topics to be discussed here are materialism, race and militarism. First, however, we should review the main thrust of the arguments presented by each author.

Week’s monograph suggests that empire was along with security, the chief motive for creating a union of states, that an expansionist consensus existed at formation, and that the existence of this consensus held the union together from 1750 until it fell apart over the existence of slavery, somewhere around 1850. Since a national consensus on expansion could not be reached, civil war broke out. The book is a study of the factors on which the consensus held together, followed by a discussion of the breakdown of this expansionist consensus. Along the way, a nations’ growth is forged by a conquest of space and the incredible 1,000 days of war and acquisition of land that resulted in a doubling of the size of the nation.

Stephanson’s approach is somewhat different, although complimentary. He accepts the expansionist motive as a given, then attempts to follow it through the entire history of the United States on a “manifest destiny” tract. He views the growth of the nation then as being motivated not by expansionist aims, but by a sense of national direction to shape first the nation, then the world along the lines of goodness as divined by God. If the resulting action was expansionist, then so be it, and if war was required to get there, then it could be explained by this preordained plan. Stephanson then follows this concept into the twentieth century and theorizes that the stage has gotten bigger, but that little has changed since the early times.

Both books then discuss growth of the empire with Stephanson explaining the motives as being driven by “manifest destiny”, and Weeks by a sense of holding the nation together. Perhaps this is a fine line of difference that can be further understood by examining the books thematically, as they discuss materialism, race and militarism.

Weeks’ approach to materialism is through the use of the word self-interest. He cites early leaders as believing that it is the one thing that all people possess, that it cannot be regulated, and that it is the basis on which men make all decisions. Stephanson’s approach is somewhat different, in that he believes materialism was less of a motivating factor than race and expansion for expansion sake, but that it wasn’t until after the Civil War that the U.S. began to build “the most efficient economic juggernaut in the world”, while other nations were constructing alliances and empires all over the globe, often by force. A third approach by Thomas Hietala in Manifest Design views materialism in the Jacksonian era as prominent, though historians have traditionally viewed this era as one of laissez-faire economics. Hietala believes, for example, that Tyler and Polk were extremely active in promoting tariff and mercantile opportunities, and attempted to provide monopolies over cotton and food, to the betterment of U.S. farmers.

One can accept all of these views, because self-interest is at the very essence of human nature, and is the driving force behind most nation-states decisions. What has made the United States unique, perhaps, is the zeal with which this trait is pursued. Have foreign policy decisions been made historically because of this trait? Probably, though official decision-making may not reveal as such. Should such decisions be made based on self-interest? One can argue that only to the extent that wars are not fought, or hardships created by such policies, but nation-states act in their self-interest, which should be the combined self-interests of their populace. This writer accepts materialism as a legitimate factor in foreign relations, and believes it has its proper place in the decision matrix. In fact, it is preferable to race and militarism, if the three could be viewed separately which of course they can’t since they are part of a continuum.

Both Weeks and Stephanson deal with race as a factor in U.S. expansion policy, although less so than Hietala. The Indian question, the slavery question, and the Mexican question are all dealt with in these books, with both authors believing that racism was a key factor in expansionist America. Stephanson quotes Friedrich Engels and Walt Whitman as early racists who expressed attitudes towards Mexicans that essentially identified them as “fortunate” to have been taken under the tutelage of America. This sentiment appears to have prevailed incessantly throughout U.S. history, so there is no surprise here. The best record of prevailing thought during the Mexican War is found in the letters of soldiers, some of which are chronicled in Stephanson. (A more thorough reading is found in James M. McCaffrey, Army of Manifest Destiny, 1992). Soldiers’ attitudes toward Mexicans, both civilian and military, was one of tremendous superiority, because they spoke a different language, were Catholic, and had “varying shades of dark skin”. Attitudes towards Afro-Americans are well known, as is the issue of genocide toward Native Americans. Stephanson offers a somewhat different view of racism, in that non-expansionists, particularly some Whigs, believed expansion should not take place into Mexican lands because of the “mongrel” race. Likewise, Hietala discusses in Texas and Black Peril, the concept that some used the issue of Texas Annexation as a way to promote removal of slaves from Southern States, with a planned exodus to South America.

The bigger question is the role of race in foreign relations decision-making, and there can be no doubt as to its historical or current import. The dilemma with the race question, however, is that empirical evidence on attitudes during the decision process is difficult, because human nature requires deceit, thus forcing the observer to draw conclusions based on after-the-fact discoveries. But it cannot go unnoticed that America did not bomb white Christians between 1945 and 1999, and one can argue that Kosovars were not Christians. U.S. belligerence has usually been directed toward non-whites, and that is not likely to change, probably until pluralism reaches the foreign service offices; until an appreciation of cultural and language differences is acquired.

These two authors address militarism in an indirect way. Stephanson believes that a dichotomy existed between the Christian ethics of manifest destiny and the need to use force in the fulfillment of expansionist policies. Thus the arguments about Ben Franklins’ pacifism, and the payment for lands conquered by the government. If there wasn’t some institutional “guilt” about the use of force in acquiring the Mexican territories, why pay virtually the same dollars that were offered before hostilities began?

Another dichotomous issue regarding the military is the lack of support for a large standing army after the Revolutionary War, and after the Civil War. When studying military history, it is so evident that Congress, and some administrations, did not want to create sufficient military strength to achieve expansionist objectives. It wasn’t until the 1890’s when Captain Alfred Mahan published The Influence of Sea Power Upon History that the use of the military to achieve expansionist goals became part of the public debate. Although the military had ultimately been part of the process to expand, the usual situation found armies woefully below operational strength for the missions that the politicians presented them with. Regarding the use of the military to achieve foreign policy objectives, this writer believes, generally, that this nation has been lead into battle typically by politicians, and that military might, gunboat diplomacy, etc. has been the forte of politicians. Support for many missions has come from a reluctant military.

These two books compliment each other in their approach to the expansion of the United States. Both are well written and contribute to our understanding of foreign relations history, and when read along with Hietala, provide a cohesive look at manifest destiny as a concept, as well as a process.