Fourth Book Review: March 1, 2000
Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire 1941-1945.By William Roger Louis.(New York, Oxford University Press, c. 1978 Pp. 573.)
Christos Frentzos
Imperialism at Bay concerns the debate between American and British wartime planners over the future of the colonial world.This was an important question and the allies struggled throughout the Second World War to reach some sort of an agreement on how the former axis colonies should be disposed of as well as the future status of the allies’ colonial holdings.Louis focuses on the themes of American anti-colonialism and American expansion, while also devoting considerable attention to British reactions to America’s growing empire and her ideas about the future of the British Empire.The book is mainly based on archival material and records of the four main participants in this debate: the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Australia.
Much of the book revolves around the trusteeship controversy between the United States and Great Britain.President Franklin Roosevelt viewed the continued existence of the colonial empires as a possible cause of future wars.He therefore advocated the eventual independence of the colonies, favoring temporary international trusteeship as a stepping stone to independence.In contrast, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the British Colonial Office were strongly opposed to colonial independence since it would mark the end of the British Empire.They favored some type of self government for the colonies within the British Empire, unfettered by international regulation.
However, the British were in no position to dictate terms following the end of the war, and had to agree to a compromised settlement on the issue.While the final settlement did not end the imperial age, since many colonial territories were maintained, the anti-colonial attitude of the United States gave powerful impetus to the decolonization of the European empires in the decades after the Second World War.
The first official meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt off Newfoundland in August 1941 resulted in the Atlantic Charter.During this first meeting, the differences between the two leaders with respect to colonial territories became readily apparent.In the Wilsonian tradition, FDR favored colonial independence, arguing that colonies were the product of economically exploitive imperialism.He insisted on free trade as a precondition of a lasting peace.Roosevelt disliked British imperialism and wanted to replace imperialism with international trusteeship, believing that subject peoples should be held in tutelage only until they could stand on their own feet.Under this system, the parent-state would have the responsibility to prepare colonials and local inhabitants for eventual independence.
In contrast, Churchill and the British Colonial Office were adamantly opposed to colonial independence since it would lead to the dissolution of the British Empire.They favored a partnership with colonials that would be similar to granting self-government, but keeping them inside the Empire.It was on this issue of the economic autarchy of the British Empire that Roosevelt and Churchill had their biggest disagreement.The issue was not resolved with the signing of the Atlantic Charter and would continue to cause tension in the Anglo-American alliance for the duration of the war.
At the Teheran Conference in December 1943, Roosevelt again expressed his view to Churchill and Joseph Stalin regarding the post-war status of the colonial world.FDR did not want to see the French have Indo-China returned to them after the war.He stated that the French had held the territory for nearly one hundred years and in that time they had done absolutely nothing to improve the lot of the people there.Roosevelt again stated his belief that colonial holdings should be placed under international trusteeship as a precondition to independence.Stalin readily agreed with Roosevelt’s proposal favoring independence for Indo-China and other colonial territories after the war.However, Churchill made clear his intentions regarding the future of the British Empire.He stated that Britain did not wish to acquire any new territory or bases, but intended to hold on to what it had.As far as colonial independence was concerned, the Prime Minister said a portion of the Empire might eventually be released but this decision would be made entirely by Great Britain at a time of her own choosing.Like the Atlantic Charter, the Teheran Conference failed to settle the issue and a final decision was again delayed.
The colonial issue also divided the military and civilian branched of the United States government with respect to the future of American possessions in the Pacific.In contrast to FDR and the State Department, most military leaders believed that the U.S., for purposes of military security, should annex the Japanese mandated islands.The American Navy saw the small Pacific islands as important strategic outposts following the war.Furthermore, they were being won at too a high cost in American blood and treasure to simply be turned over to some international commission.This is exactly what Churchill and many of the British feared.They suspected all along that Roosevelt was merely using the rhetoric of trusteeship as a cover for annexationist ambitions.However the author argues that the evidence here is open to various interpretations.
To his credit, Roosevelt stood strong in the face of criticism from his military advisers.He stated in no uncertain terms that it was his definite desire that the principle of international trusteeship be firmly established and that an international organization (the future UN) should provide adequate machinery for that purpose.FDR felt that annexation would accomplish little more than provide jobs as governors of insignificant islands for inefficient Army and Navy officers or members of the civilian career service.Roosevelt believed that trusteeship was the best means of stabilizing unsettled areas and opening the door to American commerce.
At the Yalta Conference in February of 1945 the allies agreed to set up the Trusteeship Council as part of the new United Nations Organization.Territorial trusteeship would apply to existing mandates of the League of Nations, territory detached from the enemy during the war, and any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.But again this statement, like the others, was rather ambiguous and did not discuss the status of other colonial holdings.Churchill himself, upon returning to England, stated he was still unsure how this affected the British Empire.
Secretary of War Henry Stimson was extremely irritated that Roosevelt had, in his opinion, compromised American security in the Pacific.After Yalta, Stimson began to seriously consider the military’s proposal of setting up a strategic trust territory in the Pacific.Under this system, America would differentiate between strategic and non-strategic territories, with the U.S. maintaining a foothold in the former for national security purposes.When Harry Truman became president in April 1945, Stimson wasted little time convincing him of the necessity of preserving strategic territories in the Pacific for the United States.The new president quickly OK’d the policy which eventually allowed the United States to maintain base rights on several Pacific islands.
At the San Francisco Conference in May 1945 the U.S. and Britain finally reached a compromised decision with respect to trusteeship.All present mandates and Japanese and Italian possessions were to be placed under the Trusteeship Council of the UN.Although the Russians argued for full national independence and self-determination in all colonial areas, the United States aligned itself with the imperial powers and accepted as part of the UN Charter the statement that self-government, rather than independence would be the goal for the other colonial territories.
The author concludes that although FDR and many officials within the State Department hoped to liquidate the British Empire after the war, the United States’ policy after 1943 tended to support rather than break up the British Imperial system.With many perceiving Russia to be a growing threat, the watchword “security” began to eclipse “independence” when discussing the future of the colonies.Louis argues that when Roosevelt died in 1945 the anti-imperialist faction within the U.S. government was mortally wounded, which resulted in America compromising with the British on the issue of colonial independence.The author seems to suggest that had Roosevelt lived, the outcome may have been quite different.Nevertheless, Louis feels that American pressure, combined with an increasing dependency on the United States and the growth of nationalism within the colonies, forced the British to face the reality that the time had finally come to take the first steps toward decolonization.As a result, the next decades witnessed a rush to independence throughout the old colonial world.
Overall,
Louis does a through job detailing the differences between the United States
and Britain over the future of colonial territories, and explaining how
a compromise was eventually reached at the San Francisco Conference in
1945.The author has uses a variety
of archival documentation and personal memoirs to create as accurate a
story as possible.However, one
has to wonder about the author’s contention that had Roosevelt lived, the
United States may have maintained a more anti-colonial position.A
good argument can be made that by 1945 the U.S. had already targeted Soviet
Russia as a potential threat, and in order to attract allies in the fight
against Communism, would have eventually compromised with the European
Imperial powers in an attempt to maintain their favor and support.Again,
as the author has noted previously, the term “security” had become more
important than “independence” to American strategic planners as they prepared
for the post-war world.